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Objective: Prospective memory (PM) is the ability to remember to carry out an intended action. Working
memory is the ability to store information in mind while processing potentially distracting information.
The few previous studies of PM in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have yielded inconsistent findings.
Studies of working memory ability in ASD have suggested a selective impairment of “visual working
memory.” However, it remains unclear whether any such impairment is the result of diminished
(domain-specific; visual/verbal) storage capacity or diminished (domain-general) processing capacity.
We aim to clarify these issues and explore the relation between PM and working memory in ASD.
Method: Seventeen adults with ASD and 17 age- and IQ-matched comparison participants completed
experimental measures of both event-based (perform action x when event y occurs) and time-based
(perform action a at time b) PM, plus a self-report measure of PM skills. Participants also completed a
working memory test battery. Results: Participants with ASD self-reported diminished PM skill, and
showed diminished performance on the time-based, but not event-based, PM task. On the working
memory test battery, visual but not verbal storage capacity was diminished among participants with ASD,
as was processing ability. Whereas visual storage was associated with event-based PM task performance
among comparison participants, verbal storage was associated among ASD participants. Conclusions:
ASD appears to involve a selective deficit in time-based PM and a selective difficulty with aspects of
working memory that depend on the storage of visual information. However, event-based PM may be
achieved through compensatory strategies in ASD.
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Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder di-
agnosed on the basis of significant behavioral impairments in social
interaction, communication, and behavioral flexibility (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Health Organization, 1993).
Although a wealth of research has explored the nature of retrospective
memory (i.e., memories or forms of learning acquired from past
experiences) in ASD, very little research has been conducted in ASD
on a form of memory that is focused on the future and is vital for
flexible everyday living, namely prospective memory (PM). PM is the
ability to remember to carry out an intended action after a delay
without any explicit instruction to do so (Kliegel, McDaniel, &
Einstein, 2008). Common examples of PM include remembering to
give someone a message, remembering to pay a bill on time, or
remembering to keep an appointment.
A critical distinction is drawn between two types of PM (Ein-
stein & McDaniel, 1990; Einstein, Richardson, Guynn, Cunfer, &
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McDaniel, 1995; Harris & Wilkins, 1982). On the one hand,
event-based PM is the ability to remember to carry out an intention
upon the occurrence of a particular, prespecified event (e.g., re-
membering to remove a pan from the stove when the timer goes
off). On the other hand, time-based PM involves remembering to
execute an intention at a particular time point (e.g., remembering
to remove a pan from the stove in 10 minutes’ time).
Event-based PM is thought to require fewer executive resources
than time-based PM, because the occurrence of the key event (e.g.,
the timer going off) can serve as a cue, which automatically
reactivates one’s prior intention. Time-based PM appears to rely
much more heavily on internal control mechanisms and the self-
initiated reactivation of one’s intention, given that no external cues
are available (e.g., Einstein et al., 1995).
Research on PM among older people has revealed a consistent
pattern of decline with age. In a review of the literature, Henry,
MacLeod, Phillips, and Crawford (2004) concluded that, in labo-
ratory settings, younger adults tend to show superior event- and
time-based PM relative to older adults. However, performance
differences between younger and older adults are significantly
larger on time-based than event-based tasks. Given that time-based
tasks entail a high executive load, this pattern of performance may
be attributable to loss of frontal lobe tissue and an associated
decline in executive control seen in normal aging (Raz, 2000). This
pattern of age-related decline in PM among older people is mir-
rored by improvements with age among typically developing chil-
dren, especially on time-based tasks, which may reflect maturation
of the frontal lobes (e.g., Kerns, 2000; Ward, Shum, McKinlay,
Baker-Tweney, & Wallace, 2005). This research is potentially
highly relevant to our understanding of memory in ASD; memory
impairments in ASD have been compared with those seen in older
individuals from the typical population, and the disorder is known
to involve deficits in some aspects of executive functioning (see
Kenworthy, Yerys, Anthony, & Wallace, 2008).
PM in ASD
To our knowledge, only two studies have explored both time-
based and event-based PM among the same sample of individuals
with ASD. Altgassen, Koban, and Kliegel (2012) assessed a sam-
ple of intellectually high-functioning adults with ASD, and an age-
and IQ-matched neurotypical comparison group, using a natural-
istic ongoing task (preparing breakfast) in which two event-based
and two time-based PM tasks were embedded. In this naturalistic
task, participants with ASD carried out both the event-based and
time-based PM instructions significantly less frequently than com-
parison participants. Moreover, participants with ASD also per-
formed significantly less well than comparison participants on a
more traditional laboratory (i.e., “pencil-and-paper”) test of event-
based PM. Taken together, these findings suggest an across-the-
board difficulty with PM in ASD. However, there are reasons for
caution in interpreting these findings. In particular, participants
with ASD performed markedly less well than comparison partic-
ipants on the ongoing naturalistic task, completing significantly
fewer of the predefined ongoing tasks, adhering less frequently to
predefined rules, monitoring time less frequently, and showing less
efficiency overall in carrying out their plans. This suggests a
pervasive difficulty with completing the task as a whole,1 and
raises the question of whether participants with ASD fully encoded
and stored the task instructions. This question is particularly per-
tinent, given that a posttask assessment of participants’ memory
for task instructions, as is usually conducted in studies of PM, was
apparently not carried out in Altgassen et al.’s study. Moreover,
there is an inherent danger with completing both event- and
time-based PM tasks within the same block of the ongoing task; if
only one form/aspect of PM is impaired, then difficulties with this
could impact negatively on the other aspect that would not, under
normal circumstances, be diminished.
In Williams, Boucher, Lind, and Jarrold (2013), intellectually
high-functioning children with ASD, plus age- and IQ-matched
comparison participants, completed both an event-based task and a
time-based PM task. The ongoing task had the same structure for
both versions, but the event-based and time-based PM components
were assessed in separate blocks (unlike in the Altgassen et al.,
2012, study). Crucially, participant groups were matched for on-
going task performance and all participants showed full retrospec-
tive memory for task instructions. Thus, any difficulties with the
experimental tasks among participants with ASD could not be a
secondary consequence of difficulties with extraneous, non-PM
task factors. The experimental results showed that participants
with ASD had significantly more time-based PM failures than
comparison participants, despite making nonsignificantly fewer
omissions on the event-based task. Williams, Boucher, et al.’s
finding that event-based PM was unimpaired in ASD was in
keeping with the findings of one other study that explored event-
based PM only (Altgassen, Schmitz-Huebsch, & Kliegel, 2010; see
also Jones et al., 2011, but see Brandimonte, Filippello, Coluccia,
Algassen, & Kliegel, 2011).
However, an immediate difficulty with interpreting the findings
of unimpaired behavioral performance on measures of event-based
PM is that individuals with ASD may have employed atypical,
compensatory strategies in order to perform well despite limited
underlying competence. A common approach to intention comple-
tion among neurotypical individuals is to encode and store one’s
intention to act in the future (e.g., to buy milk on the way home
from work), to then cease focusing attention on the intention while
getting on with one’s other activities (e.g., work), and then to
spontaneously retrieve the intention at the appropriate point (e.g.,
as one approaches the supermarket on one’s walk home). This kind
of “spontaneous retrieval” route to PM is self-reported by over
70% of neurotypical adults and children (e.g., Einstein & McDan-
iel, 1996; Ward et al., 2005), although nonautomatic processing
may nonetheless be required for successful PM in some (particu-
larly demanding) circumstances (see Einstein & McDaniel, 1996).
However, in the studies by Williams, Boucher, et al. (2013) and
Altgassen et al. (2010), individuals with ASD may have succeeded
on the event-based PM tasks merely by rehearsing their intention
(in working memory) throughout the task. Under these circum-
stances, successful PM performance would (by definition) depend
almost entirely on working memory, which is defined as the ability
to hold information in mind (in this case, one’s intention) in the
1 In studies of PM, performance on the ongoing task in which the PM
targets are embedded needs to be considered when interpreting experimen-
tal PM task performance. If participant groups are not equated for ongoing
task performance, then group differences in performance on the PM task
might result from differences in the ratio of attentional resources devoted
to the ongoing task relative to the PM task.
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face of potentially distracting activity (in this case, one’s ongoing
activities; Baddeley, 1986; Jarrold & Towse, 2006). Note that such
a strategy would result in a greater chance of PM success in an
event-based task than in a time-based task (cf. Williams, Boucher,
et al., 2013), because only in the former is there a cue (i.e., the
event itself) to tell you when to act. Without such a cue, one may
simply miss the appropriate point to act (i.e., to switch activities)
even though one is constantly rehearsing one’s intention.
A logical consequence of the hypothesis that individuals with
ASD are atypical in relying on verbal rehearsal of task instructions
to succeed on PM tasks is that verbal working memory is itself
relatively unimpaired in this disorder. A thorough review of stud-
ies of working memory ability in ASD concluded that there is
robust evidence of deficits on spatial/visual working memory
tasks, whereas the evidence for diminished performance on verbal
working memory tasks is negligible (Kenworthy et al., 2008).
Thus, the notion that verbal working memory is intact in ASD is
perfectly in keeping with the possibility that individuals with this
disorder employ verbally based strategies on PM tasks (as they do
on some retrospective memory tasks; e.g., Williams, Bowler, &
Jarrold, 2012). However, there are several issues to bear in mind
when considering working memory ability in ASD.
A key distinction in the cognitive psychology literature is be-
tween short-term and working memory, with the former referring
to individuals’ ability to store or hold in mind information in
correct serial order, and the latter referring to specific situations in
which the storage of information has to take place in the face of
concurrent distracting processing (see Jarrold & Towse, 2006).
Thus, whereas short-term memory (STM) tasks require only stor-
age, and involve participants simply recalling a sequence of just-
presented items in correct serial order (e.g., digit span, Corsi block
span), working memory tasks involve both processing and storage
of information (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). Consequently, one
of the most commonly used and widely accepted measures of
working memory is the complex span procedure (Conway et al.,
2005), in which the presentation of each successive storage item is
paired with a period of potentially distracting processing activity;
again, serial recall of the set of storage items is required. Although
STM and working memory measures therefore overlap to some
degree in typical development, they are consistently distinguish-
able in factor analyses (Alloway, Gathercole, & Pickering, 2006;
Bayliss, Jarrold, Baddeley, Gunn, & Leigh, 2005; Bayliss, Jarrold,
Gunn, & Baddeley, 2003; Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge, &
Wearing, 2004; Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005). As such, any
potential impairment of working memory in ASD could be due to
either diminished storage capacity, diminished processing ability,
or a reduction in the executive capacity required to coordinate
storage and processing (Bayliss et al., 2003). At present, it is not
clear from the existing literature what the basis of any potential
diminution of working memory is in ASD.
A further issue that is essential to bear in mind concerns the
domain-specificity/domain-generality of working memory. Cur-
rent theories of the relation between short-term and working mem-
ory in both neurotypical children and adults suggest that the
short-term storage of to-be-remembered information rests on the
functioning of domain-specific systems, in that verbal and visu-
ospatial STM can be dissociated experimentally and clinically
(e.g., Hale, Myerson, Rhee, Weiss, & Abrams, 1996; Jarrold,
Baddeley, & Hewes, 1999). In contrast, processing of information
in working memory tasks appears to depend on a domain-general
ability that is not influenced by the modality (visual/verbal) of the
material-to-be-processed (Bayliss et al., 2003; Kane et al., 2005).
As such, the situation is not straightforward enough to claim that
visual (or verbal) working memory is (specifically) impaired in
ASD, as some have argued (e.g., Kenworthy et al., 2008), because
the matter is conceptually more complex than this. It may be that
visual STM is impaired in ASD, and that this contributes to a poor
performance on working memory tasks that involve the storage of
visual information, without there being any fundamental difficulty
in combining storage and processing operations in working mem-
ory in general in ASD.
In the current study, we were able to explore these issues in
ASD by employing a version of the test battery that Bayliss et al.
(2003, 2005) developed to assess the relative contributions of
processing and storage abilities to complex span among neurotypi-
cal adults and children. In Bayliss et al.’s (2003) study, either a
verbal or visual processing task was combined with verbal or
visual storage demands to create four complex working memory
span tasks. Crucially, participants also completed separate tests of
these exact visual and verbal storage, and processing requirements,
which were measured independently. This allowed Bayliss et al. to
decompose complex span performance into its storage and pro-
cessing components, as well as any residual (potentially executive)
variation. This general approach was adopted here to enable us to
examine the extent to which storage capacity, processing effi-
ciency, and the ability to combine storage and processing are
impaired, or otherwise, in ASD. However, because previous work
has indicated that processing efficiency depends on domain-
general resources, the current study only included one type of
processing, namely, verbal processing. However, storage modality
was varied (verbal vs. visual) to create two complex span tasks.
In the current study, participants completed experimental mea-
sures of both event-based and time-based PM, as well as complet-
ing a self-report measure of both prospective and retrospective
memory abilities. Participants also completed the modified Bayliss
et al. (2003) working memory test battery just described. The aims
of the study were threefold.
First, we aimed to investigate the extent to which PM is im-
paired in ASD. On the self-report measure (for full details of the
measure, see Method section), we predicted that participants
would report everyday difficulties with PM (as well as with
retrospective memory). In terms of experimental task performance,
we predicted that significantly more PM failures (i.e., failures to
carry out the PM instruction at the appropriate point) would be
observed among ASD participants than among comparison partic-
ipants on the time-based experimental task but not on the event-
based experimental task. Moreover, on the time-based task, we
predicted that even when participants with ASD did successfully
remember to carry out the PM instruction in the target window of
time (which was 
8 s from the target time; see Method section),
they would do so at a time that was closer to the end of this
window (i.e., more distant from the actual target time) than would
comparison participants. In other words, even when participants
with ASD were successful, they would be less precise than com-
parison participants at carrying out the intended action. With
regard to event-based task performance, however, we predicted
that there would not be a significant group difference in the
distance from the target event at which participants carried out the
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PM instruction. That is, we predicted that participants with ASD
would not be less precise than comparison participants on success-
ful PM trials of the event-based task.
Second, we aimed to clarify the profile of strengths and diffi-
culties in working memory among individuals with ASD. With
regard to performance on the simple span tasks, we predicted that
visuospatial storage capacity would be diminished, whereas verbal
storage capacity would be undiminished. We were uncertain
whether processing ability would be diminished among partici-
pants with ASD. With regard to the complex span tasks, several
possibilities were evident. One possibility was that executive dif-
ficulties with combining storage and processing requirements
among participants with ASD would lead to impairments in all
forms of complex span, regardless of whether the visual or verbal
information is involved. An alternative possibility was that pre-
dicted difficulties with visuospatial storage would lead to a dimi-
nution of performance on the complex span task involving visual
information only.
Third, we aimed to explore the link between PM and working
memory. Here, we had the specific prediction that there would be
a unique relation between verbal storage capacity and event-based
PM among individuals with ASD.
Finally, we explored the link between self-reported memory
ability and experimental PM task performance. This allowed us to
explore the extent to which individuals with ASD are self-aware of
their own PM abilities; accurate self-awareness would be implied
if there was a significant correlation between self-reported mem-
ory ability and experimental PM task performance. It should be
noted that this exploration was conducted as a result of comments
provided by an anonymous reviewer of the original draft of this
article. Thus, analyses concerning this aim are post hoc and ex-
ploratory.
Method
Participants
Seventeen adults with ASD (14 male) and 17 neurotypical
comparison adults (14 male) took part in this experiment, after
providing written informed consent to take part. Participants in the
ASD group had all received formal diagnoses of autistic disorder
(n 4) or Asperger’s disorder (n 13), according to conventional
criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Health
Organization, 1993). All participants with ASD completed the
Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright,
Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), a self-report measure of ASD
features, and 13 of 17 were administered the Autism Diagnostic
Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000), a detailed ob-
servational assessment of ASD features. Four participants with
ASD did not consent to complete the ADOS because they did not
wish to be filmed. All comparison participants completed the AQ.
All participants who completed the ADOS scored above the
defined cutoff for ASD (total score 7; Lord et al., 2000). The
mean ADOS total score of the ASD group was in the autism range.
Fifteen of the 17 participants with ASD scored above the defined
cutoff for ASD on the AQ (total score 26; Woodbury-Smith,
Robinson, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2005). The two partic-
ipants with ASD who scored below 26 on the AQ each scored well
above the defined ASD cutoff on the ADOS (each participant
scored 12). The four participants with ASD who did not complete
the ADOS all scored well above the defined ASD cutoff on the AQ
(all scores 35). All participants in the comparison group scored
below the defined cutoff for ASD on the AQ. No participant in
either group reported any current use of psychotropic medication
or illegal recreational drugs, and none reported any history of
neurological or psychiatric illness other than ASD.
Using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI;
Wechsler, 1999), the groups were equated closely for verbal and
nonverbal ability. The groups were also equated closely for chro-
nological age. Participant characteristics are presented in Table 1.
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from Durham
University Ethics Committee.
Tests and Procedures
Self-reported prospective and retrospective memory ability.
All participants completed the Prospective and Retrospective
Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ; Smith et al., 2000). The PRMQ is
a 16-item self-report measure of everyday slips in prospective and
retrospective memory. Each question is on a scale of 0 to 5, where
0 corresponds to never having a problem and 5 corresponds to very
often having a problem. Eight items concern PM difficulties (e.g.,
“Do you decide to do something in a few minutes’ time and then
forget to do it?”) and eight items concern retrospective memory
difficulties (e.g., “Do you fail to recall things that have happened
to you in the last few days?”).
Table 1
Participant Characteristics
Group
t p Cohen’s dASD (n  17) TD (n  17)
Age 31.06 (9.64) 31.92 (14.17) 0.21 .84 0.07
VIQ 111.41 (15.79) 114.64 (13.95) 0.63 .53 0.21
PIQ 113.47 (15.16) 116.88 (12.23) 0.72 .47 0.25
FSIQ 114.06 (15.16) 117.71 (13.05) 0.75 .49 0.26
AQ total score 35.59 (9.17) 13.24 (6.37) 8.10  .001 2.78
ADOS total scorea 12.36 (2.20) — — — —
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder; TD  Typically developing; VIQ  verbal intelligence quotient;
PIQ  performance intelligence quotient; FSIQ  Full-scale intelligence quotient; AQ  Autism Spectrum
Quotient; ADOS  Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule.
a Based on 13/17 participants.
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Factor analytic studies among the typical population reveal a
tripartite structure of the PRMQ, including a general memory
factor, plus orthogonal factors capturing retrospective memory and
PM abilities, respectively (e.g., Crawford, Henry, Ward, & Blake
2006; Crawford, Smith, Maylor, Della Sala, & Logie, 2003; Rönn-
lund, Mäntylä, & Nilsson, 2008).
PM task. The ongoing task (a trial of which is illustrated in
Figure 1), in which the PM tasks/instructions were embedded, took
the same format for both the event-based and time-based PM
conditions. In each condition, the ongoing task lasted for 10 min
and was presented on a ThinkPad laptop. Participants were pre-
sented with a series of study lists (80 in total across both condi-
tions) that consisted of seven individually presented high-
frequency words shown at a rate of one word per second. After the
presentation of each study list, there appeared a test list that
contained seven words on a single screen. The test list remained on
screen for 4 s. Participants were asked to make a yes–no recogni-
tion judgment, via keyboard button press, about whether the words
in the test list were the same as the words in the immediately
preceding study list. On 50% of trials, the words in the test list
were identical to those in the study list. In the remaining 50% of
trials, the test list differed from the study list by one item. The lure
item in these incongruent trials was placed in random position
within the test list. Participants were awarded a score of one for
every trial in which they made a correct recognition judgment and
a score of zero for every trial in which they made an incorrect
recognition judgment. In each PM condition, there were a total of
40 ongoing trials, thus yielding an ongoing task score of between
0 and 40. At the end of each trial, a blank screen appeared for 1.5
s, followed by a 500-ms fixation cross to alert the participant that
the next trial was about to begin.
Two sets of 280 high-frequency words were employed as stim-
uli for the ongoing task. The use of each set was counterbalanced
across the time-based and event-based PM conditions. The sets
were equated for mean syllable length of items, and for mean word
frequency, as indexed by Kucera and Francis (1967) and reported
in the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981). Confirm-
ing the adequacy of this matching, a multivariate analysis of these
measures across the two sets revealed a nonsignificant main effect
of set using Wilks’ criterion, F(2, 557)  0.93, p  .39.
Verbal instructions for both the ongoing task and for the PM
component of the task in each condition were given by the exper-
imenter immediately prior to testing. Participants completed four
practice trials of the ongoing task before being given the PM
instructions.
In the time-based condition, participants were told that they
should press the “P” key at 2-min intervals throughout the ongoing
task (i.e., at Minutes 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10). They were informed that
they could bring up a digital clock at any time throughout the
ongoing task by pressing the spacebar. The clock began running at
the time the ongoing task was started, so displayed the exact task
duration in minutes and seconds up to that point. After the space-
bar had been pressed, the clock remained on screen for 1.5 s before
disappearing. A PM failure in this condition was defined as a
failure to press the P key within a 16-s window around each 2-min
target time (i.e., within 8 s prior to or 8 s after each 2-min mark).
For example, an individual who pressed the P key at 2 min 9 s
would be considered to have had a PM failure. This time frame
was selected to ensure that even if the 2-min target time fell during
the middle of an ongoing trial (i.e., during the presentation of items
in the study phase of the ongoing task), participants would still
have time to make a PM response within the target window. In
other words, even if the 2-min target time fell during the study
phase of an ongoing trial, participants would still have time to
make a PM response within the target window if they waited until
after the study phase to press the P key. For example, if a 4-min
interval fell during an ongoing trial on which the first stimulus
word had just been presented, 8 s allows for participants to learn
all the stimuli in the ongoing trial and still make a successful PM
response if they press the P key at the end of the ongoing trial.
In the time-based condition, measures recorded included pro-
portion of PM failures (number of times participants failed to press
the P key within the predetermined response window divided by
the number of PM trials; 0 to 1); ongoing task score (total number
of trials in which participants made the correct recognition judg-
ment; 0 to 40); and the number and distribution of clock checks
throughout the task. Breaking down trials into intervals to measure
the distribution of clock checks is typical in studies of PM, with an
increase in checking toward the end of the target period being
thought to reflect strategic monitoring for the target time (e.g.,
Kerns, 2000; Mäntyla, Carelli, & Forman, 2007; Mackinlay, Klie-
gel, & Mäntyla, 2009). Finally, across all successful PM trials (i.e.,
trials on which the P key was pressed within 8 s on either side of
each 2-min target time), we also measured the mean temporal
distance from the 2-min target that participants carried out the PM
instruction.
In the event-based condition, the PM instruction was to press the
“M” key every time a musical instrument appeared in the test list
of the ongoing task. Specifically, participants were told that if a
musical instrument appeared in the test list, then they should press
the M key instead of making a yes–no recognition judgment (i.e.,
they should ignore the ongoing trial and respond to the target
event). One of four musical instruments (piano, guitar, drum, or
violin) appeared in the 8th test list of the task and then every 10
trials thereafter (i.e., Trials 8, 18, 28, and 38). Musical instruments
did not appear in any study list. A PM failure in this condition was
defined as a failure to press the M key during the presentation of
a test list that contained a musical instrument). Measures recorded
were proportion of PM failures (number of times participants
 + 
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Figure 1. Structure of a trial of the ongoing task.
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failed to press the M key after the presentation of a musical
instrument divided by the number of PM trials; 0 to 1) and ongoing
task score (total number of trials in which participants made the
correct recognition judgment; 0 to 40). With regard to the ongoing
task score, on PM target trials in which a musical instrument
appeared in the test list, participants were given a score of 1 for the
ongoing task if they pressed the M key. This is because, by
definition, if participants responded to the musical instrument, then
they must have recognized that the test and study lists were
incongruent with one another (musical instruments never appeared
in study lists). If they did not press the M key on target trials (i.e.,
if they had a PM failure), then they were given a score of 1 for the
ongoing task if they correctly recognized that the test list did not
contain the same words as the study list (i.e., made a “no” judg-
ment) or a score of 0 if they incorrectly judged that the test list did
contain the same words as the study list (i.e., made a “yes”
judgment). As such, ongoing task performance was independent of
PM task performance. Finally, across all successful PM trials, we
also measured the time taken to carry out the PM instruction after
the appearance of the relevant test list.
At the end of each PM task, retrospective memory for PM
instructions was assessed. All participants were able to recall the
PM instructions, including necessary key presses, in both condi-
tions. The order in which the event-based and time-based PM tasks
were completed was counterbalanced across participants.
Working memory task battery. We employed a version of
the working memory test battery devised and used by Bayliss et al.
(2003, 2005).
Complex span tasks. We employed two complex span tasks
that were formed by crossing verbal processing with each of the
two types of storage (verbal and visual). In each task, participants
were presented with a series of screens that each showed nine
different colored squares spaced in a random arrangement on a
gray background. Each square contained one of the numbers 1 to
9, and the position of these numbers changed on each screen. The
verbal processing element involved the participant hearing an auditorily
presented item name (e.g., “banana”) and being required to find and
click the mouse cursor on the correspondingly colored circle (i.e.,
yellow) as quickly as possible. Once a target square had been
selected, all other squares disappeared, and the selected square
remained on the screen until a total of 4 s had elapsed since the
onset of auditorily presented object name. The next processing
episode began immediately after this 4-s period. If participants
failed to click on a square within 3 s of the presentation of the
object name, the correct square appeared individually at this point
and remained on screen for the remaining 1 s of the processing
window. There was a 250-ms window, in which a blank screen
was shown, between each processing episode. Object names were
chosen from a set that had previously been shown to reliably
indicate the target color (Bayliss et al., 2003). The names were
prerecorded by a male experimenter and played through computer
speakers during the tasks.
The participant’s task then depended on the type of storage
required. In tasks involving verbal storage, participants had to
remember the digit shown in the square that they had clicked on,
whereas in tasks involving visuospatial storage, they remembered
the spatial position the square appeared in (this contrast between
serial recall of digits as opposed to spatial locations is one that is
commonly used to tap verbal as opposed to visuospatial storage in
the working memory literature; e.g., Alloway et al., 2006; Hale,
Bronik, & Fry, 1997). At the end of the trial, participants were
required to recall this information in correct serial order. In the
tasks involving verbal storage, participants had to repeat the digits
that had been presented in the previously located target squares,
and in the visual storage conditions, they were shown a response
screen that displayed all nine of the potential target locations and
had to click the cursor on the subset of locations occupied by the
previously identified target squares in the order in which those
target locations had originally been presented. In this way, we
generated two directly comparable tasks from a single display:
verbal processing with verbal storage, and verbal processing with
visuospatial storage. In each task, trials increased in length from
three to eight sequences. There were three trials at each sequence
length. Each trial was considered to have been successfully com-
pleted if all items were recalled in correct order. If at least one of
the three trials at a given sequence length was successfully com-
pleted, the participant was given another set of (three) trials at a
greater sequence length. When none of the trials at a given se-
quence length was successfully completed (or when the participant
completed Level 6, which involved eight-item sequences), the
participant moved on to the next task. For both visual and verbal
complex span tasks, participants completed two practice trials
before experimental trials began.
Participants’ complex span was determined by averaging the
number of items in the last three trials that were recalled in correct
serial order. Thus, an individual who recalled one (out of three)
six-item trials and two (out of three) five-item trials would have a
span score of 5.33 (that is, [5  5  6]/3).
Processing efficiency task. A separate verbal processing task
was completed by all participants. This processing task was iden-
tical to that involved in the complex span tasks but did not involve
any storage requirement. Again, participants were presented with a
series of screens, each of which showed nine different colored
squares. For each screen, participants heard an auditorily presented
item name and were required to find and click the mouse cursor on
the correspondingly colored square as quickly as possible. Once
the participant made their response, however long it took, the next
trial was presented. In total, participants completed 40 processing-
only trials, although the first four trials were considered practice
trials and hence excluded from later analysis. Across the 36 test
trials, the average time participants took to select the correct
colored square was considered as the measure of processing effi-
ciency/speed. Only trials on which participants selected the correct
square were included in this measure.
Storage tasks. All participants also completed separate tasks
assessing verbal and visual storage capacity, respectively. These
storage tasks were structurally identical to those in the complex
span tasks but did not involve any additional processing require-
ment. Storage span was calculated in the same way that complex
span was. In both storage tasks, nine blank squares initially ap-
peared on the screen in the same apparently random arrangement
as used in all the tasks. One square flashed up with a number
between one and nine contained inside it. This square remained
highlighted for 1.4 s before going blank. After a 250-ms blank
interval, a different square containing another number flashed up.
Participants were presented with sequences ranging from three to
eight squares. In the verbal storage task, after presentation of the
last item in each trial, the screen went blank and the participant
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was invited to recall, in serial order, the digits contained in the
previously highlighted squares. In the visual storage condition,
after presentation of the last item in each trial, participants were
shown a response screen that displayed all eight of the potential
target locations. Just as in the complex visual span task, partici-
pants had to click the cursor on the subset of locations of occupied
by the previously identified target squares in the order in which
those target locations had originally been presented. There were
three trials at each sequence length. Participants completed two
practice trials before experimental trials began.
Across all participants, the presentation of tasks was fixed in the
sense that complex span tasks were always completed first, fol-
lowed by the storage-only tasks, followed by the processing
efficiency-only task. However, task modality was counterbalanced
across participants. Half of the participants from each group com-
pleted the verbal versions of the complex span and storage-only
tasks first, whereas the other half completed the visual versions
first. Hence, half of participants completed tasks in the following
order: verbal complex span, visual complex span, verbal storage
only, visual storage only, processing efficiency. The remaining
half of participants completed tasks in the following order: visual
complex span, verbal complex span, visual storage only, verbal
storage only, processing efficiency.
Results
PM Data
Do participants with ASD self-report PM difficulties in ev-
eryday life? Table 2 shows the mean raw scores and t scores
among ASD and comparison participants on each of the PM and
retrospective memory subscales of the PRMQ. A mixed ANOVA
was conducted on the raw scores from each subscale, with group
(ASD/comparison) as the between-participants variable and sub-
scale (prospective/retrospective) as the within-participants vari-
able. The main effect of subscale was significant, F(1, 31) 
18.98, p  .001, partial 2  .38 reflecting higher raw scores on
the Prospective Memory subscale than the Retrospective Memory
subscale. The main effect of group was also significant, F(1, 31)
9.25, p  .005, partial 2  .23, reflecting the superior perfor-
mance of comparison participants overall. Finally, the interaction
between group and subscale was not significant, F(1, 31)  0.39,
p  .54, partial 2  .01.
Among comparison participants, the standardized (t) score on
the Prospective Memory subscale was not significantly different
from the population average of 50, t(16) 1.21, p .24, d 0.28.
However, the t score on the Retrospective Memory subscale was
significantly above the population average, t(16) 3.00, p .009,
d  0.61. Among participants with ASD, the t score on the
Prospective Memory subscale was significantly below the popu-
lation average, t(15)  2.20, p  .04, d  0.68. The t score on the
Retrospective Memory subscale was not significantly below the
population average, although a (small to modest) trend was ob-
served, t(15)  1.80, p  .09, d  0.47.
How do participants perform on the ongoing component of
the laboratory PM tasks? Table 3 shows overall ongoing task
performance (number of trials, out of 80, on which a correct
recognition judgment was made) collapsed across event-based and
time-based conditions among ASD and comparison participants. A
mixed ANOVA was conducted on these data, with group (ASD/
comparison) as the between-participants variable and condition
(time-based/event-based) as the within-participants variable. The
main effect of condition was not significant, F(1, 32)  0.13, p 
.72, partial 2  .004. The main effect of group was not signifi-
cant, F(1, 32)  0.01, p  .93, partial 2  .003. Finally, the
interaction between group and condition was also not significant,
F(1, 32)  0.09, p  .77, partial 2  .001. Thus, in terms of
ongoing task performance, no difference between the groups ap-
proached significance and none were associated with anything
other than a negligible/small effect size. As such, any group
differences in performance on the PM component of each task
cannot be attributed to baseline differences between the groups in
ongoing task performance.
How do participants perform on the PM component of the
experimental tasks? Table 3 shows the mean proportion of PM
failures made by ASD and typically developing (TD) participants
in each task (time-based/event-based).2 A mixed ANOVA was
conducted on these data, with group (ASD/comparison) as the
between-participants variable and PM task (time-based/event-
based) as the within-participants variable. There was a significant
main effect of PM task, F(1, 31) 4.09, p .05, partial 2 .11,
reflecting superior performance on the time-based task than in the
event-based task. The main effect of group was not significant,
F(1, 31)  0.04, p  .85, partial 2  .001. However, there was
a significant interaction between PM task and group, F(1, 31) 
5.87, p  .02, partial 2  .16. Independent-samples t tests
revealed that participants with ASD performed significantly less
well than comparison participants in the time-based task, t(31) 
2.04, p  .05, d  0.78, but nonsignificantly better than compar-
ison participants in the event-based task, t(32)  1.20, p  .24,
d  0.43.
Among participants from both groups, performance in both the
event-based and time-based tasks was significantly above floor
and significantly below ceiling (all ps  .04).
How precise (i.e., close to the target) were participants’
correct PM actions? Across successful time-based PM trials,
participants took, on average, the following number of seconds to
2 Data on the time-based PM task from one participant with ASD was
excluded, because of a failure to adhere to task instructions (the participant
repeatedly pressed the P key throughout the entire task, despite constant
reminders that they should only press the key at the target time).
Table 2
Self-Reported Prospective and Retrospective Memory Ability
Among ASD and TD Participants (Means and SDs)
Group
Cohen’s
dASD TD
Prospective subscale: Raw score 24.69 (8.13) 18.65 (4.60) 0.95
Prospective subscale: T scorea 41.13 (16.14) 52.71 (9.19) 0.95
Retrospective subscale: Raw score 21.00 (5.55) 15.88 (3.60) 1.12
Retrospective subscale: T scorea 45.00 (11.10) 55.24 (7.21) 1.12
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder; TD  typically developing.
a T scores are standardized to a mean score of 50 (SD  10).
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carry out the PM instruction after the 2-min target time: ASD, M
2.59, SD  1.15; comparison, M  1.50, SD  0.95.
Across successful event-based PM trials, participants took, on
average, the following number of seconds to carry out the PM
instruction after the appearance of a test list that contained a
musical instrument: ASD, M 2.31, SD 0.66; comparison, M
2.01, SD  0.53.
A mixed ANOVA was conducted on these data, with group
(ASD/comparison) as the between-participants variable and PM
task (time-based/event-based) as the within-participants variable.
The main effect of PM task was not significant, F(1, 27)  0.35,
p .56, partial 2 .01. The main effect of group was significant,
F(1, 27)  9.55, p  .005, partial 2  .26, reflecting poorer
performance overall among participants with ASD. However,
there was a significant interaction between PM task and group,
F(1, 27)  5.37, p  .03, partial 2  .17. Independent-samples
t tests revealed that participants with ASD carried out the PM
instruction significantly less efficiently/precisely than comparison
participants in the time-based task, t(30)  2.93, p  .007, d 
1.04, but not in the event-based task, t(29)  1.40, p  .17, d 
0.50.
How often and at what points did participants check the
clock during the time-based PM task? Figure 2 shows the
number of clock checks made in each of the four 30-s intervals
preceding the target time (averaged across the five time-based PM
trials). A mixed ANOVA was conducted on these data, with group
(ASD/comparison) as the between-participants variable and time
period (0 to 30 s, 31 to 60 s, 61 to 90 s, 91 to 120 s) as the
within-participants variable. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was sig-
nificant, 2(5) 102.75, p .001. Therefore, Greenhouse-Geisser
corrections were employed. There was a significant main effect of
time period, F(3, 1.16)  35.42, p  .001, partial 2  .53.
Within-participant contrasts suggested mainly linear, F  45.80,
p  .001, and cubic, F  21.45, p  .001, effects, although a
quadratic effect was also evident to a lesser extent, F  6.23, p 
.02. The main effect of group was not significant, F(1, 31)  0.45,
p  .51, partial 2  .01. The interaction between group and time
period was also not significant, F(3, 1.16)  0.40, p  .56, partial
2  .01. Thus, there was no evidence of any reliable group
difference in either the overall frequency of clock checks or the
distribution of clock checks across each trial.
What was the association between self-reported PM ability
on the PRMQ, and event-based and time-based experimental
task performance? Within each group, we explored the extent
to which number of PM failures in each experimental task (event-
based/time-based) was associated with participants’ raw score on
the PM subscale of the PRMQ. In each analysis, we controlled for
ongoing task performance in order to gain a pure measure of the
relation between PM task performance and self-reported PM abil-
ity, independent of the general (non-PM) demands of the experi-
mental PM tasks.
The number of time-based PM failures was not associated
significantly with self-reported PM ability among either group, all
rs  .11, all ps  .67. Among participants with ASD, the
number of event-based PM failures was only weakly (negatively)
and nonsignificantly associated with raw score on the PM subscale
of the PRMQ, r  .06, p  .83. However, among comparison
participants, the equivalent association was moderate to strong and
positive, although not quite statistically significant, r  .43, p 
.08. Thus, among comparison participants, poorer performance on
the experimental event-based PM task was associated with poorer
self-reported PM ability.
Working Memory Assessment
How efficient were participants at processing information
on the processing efficiency task? In terms of comprehending
the meaning of item names, there was no significant difference in
the number of trials (out of 36) in which participants with ASD
(M  28.71, SD  3.99) and comparison participants (M  30.00,
SD  2.83) selected the correct colored square on the independent
test of processing efficiency, t(32)  1.09, p  .28, d  0.38.
Thus, object names had equivalent meanings for ASD and com-
parison participants. In terms of processing efficiency, however,
matters were different. The time (in seconds) that ASD participants
took to select the correct square (M  2.30, SD  0.40) was
significantly longer than the time taken by comparison participants
(M  1.92, SD  0.31), t(32)  3.10, p  .004, d  1.07.
How large were participants’ complex and simple spans?
Table 4 shows the mean complex and simple spans achieved in
verbal and visual modalities by participants from each diagnostic
group. These data were subjected to a 2 (group: ASD/comparison)  2
(task: complex span/simple span)  2 (modality: verbal/visual)
ANOVA. Overall, there were significant main effects of task, F(1,
Table 3
Time-Based and Event-Based PM Task Performance, and
Overall Ongoing Task Performance, Among ASD and TD
Participants (Means and SDs)
Group
dASD TD
Overall ongoing task score 58.88 (8.87) 58.65 (5.89) 0.03
Proportion of time-based failures .21 (.32) .05 (.09) 0.78
Proportion of event-based failures .19 (.29) .33 (.36) 0.43
Note. PM  prospective memory; ASD  autism spectrum disorder;
TD  typically developing.
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Figure 2. Average number of clock checks (averaged across trials) made
by ASD and TD participants during the time-based PM task.
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32)  37.08, p  .001; modality, F(1, 32)  30.21, p  .001; and
group, F(1, 32)  4.75, p  .04. These significant main effects
reflected the facts that, overall, complex span was smaller than
simple span, visual span was smaller than verbal span, and partic-
ipants with ASD performed less well than comparison participants.
There was a significant interaction between group and modality,
F(1, 32)  4.96, p  .03. Independent-samples t tests revealed
that, across the complex span and simple span tasks, participants
with ASD performed significantly less well than comparison par-
ticipants in the visual modality, t(32)  2.86, p  .008, d  1.00,
but not in the verbal modality, t(32)  0.48, p  .64, d  0.17.
No further interactions were significant, all ps  .50, all partial
2s  .02.
What was the association between experimental PM task
performance and working memory task performance?
Within each group, we explored the extent to which number of PM
failures in each experimental task (event-based/time-based) was
associated with participants’ complex span (verbal and visual),
simple span (verbal and visual), and verbal processing ability.
In each analysis, we controlled for ongoing task performance in
order to gain a pure measure of the relation between PM task
performance and working memory, independent of the general
(non-PM) demands of the experimental PM task. These partial
correlations are shown in Table 5. Among comparison partici-
pants, event-based PM performance was associated significantly
with simple visual span, whereas among ASD participants, event-
based PM performance was associated significantly with simple
verbal span. In this respect, ASD and comparison participants
were the mirror image of each other. Among ASD participants,
event-based PM performance was additionally significantly asso-
ciated with verbal processing ability.
Discussion
Until now, only two studies have investigated both event-based
and time-based PM ability among individuals with ASD (Altgas-
sen et al., 2012; Williams, Boucher, et al., 2013). Given that these
studies have produced contradictory results, the first aim of the
current study was to clarify the profile of PM ability among
individuals with this disorder. The second aim of the study was to
elucidate the nature of working memory ability among individuals
with ASD. In relation to this, it was unclear whether “diminished
visual working memory” (as some have claimed characterizes
ASD) is the consequence of a reduced capacity to store visual
information (simple visual span), lower processing speed, or an
executive difficulty with combining storage and processing de-
mands.
In relation to the first aim of the study, we found that individuals
with ASD self-reported significant difficulties with PM in their
everyday lives. To our knowledge, this is the first study to gain
self-reports of PM ability specifically among people with ASD.
Altgassen et al. (2012) found self-reported difficulties in executive
functions that are thought to be related to PM. While those results
are important, they do not establish whether individuals with ASD
believe themselves to have actual PM difficulties in everyday life.
Our results—from a well-established, reliable, and valid self-
report measure of PM ability (the PRMQ)—show that adults with
ASD do believe themselves to have everyday difficulties with PM,
which is important. Interestingly, however, whereas self-reported
memory abilities were moderately to strongly associated with
experimental event-based PM task performance among compari-
son participants, there was no such positive association among
participants with ASD. This may suggest that self-awareness of
PM ability is somewhat more accurate among neurotypical indi-
viduals than it is among individuals with ASD, which fits with the
view that ASD involves deficits in metacognition (or “theory of
own mind”) (see Williams, 2010). However, the analysis that
revealed these differences was conducted post hoc and should be
treated with caution pending independent replication.
A central finding of the current article was the replication of
Williams, Boucher, et al.’s (2013) finding of significantly dimin-
ished time-based PM, but undiminished performance event-based
PM, among individuals with ASD. Importantly, the effect sizes
associated with group differences in PM task performance were
very similar in each study. In the Williams, Boucher, et al. study,
between-groups differences in time-based and event-based PM
task performance were associated with Cohen’s d values of 0.68
and 0.17, respectively. The corresponding d values in the current
study were 0.78 and 0.42. Thus, despite the different sample
characteristics in the two studies (children in the Williams,
Boucher, et al. study; adults in the current study) and the quite
different ongoing task demands of the PM tasks (a driving simu-
lation in the Williams, Boucher, et al. study; a recognition memory
task in the current study), the experimental PM results are notably
consistent. Among comparison participants, a greater proportion of
failures were made on the experimental event-based PM task than
on the experimental time-based PM task. Among participants with
ASD, the proportion of failures was similar on both tasks. In
addition, it is important to note that the failure to observe an
Table 4
Working Memory Task Performance Among ASD and TD
Participants (Means and SDs)
Group
dASD TD
Complex span: Verbal 6.27 (1.08) 6.41 (0.71) 0.16
Complex span: Visual 4.81 (1.38) 5.92 (0.95) 0.95
Simple span: Verbal 7.14 (1.15) 7.27 (0.76) 0.14
Simple span: Visual 5.72 (1.25) 6.54 (0.82) 0.79
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder; TD  typically developing.
Table 5
Partial Correlations
Time-based PM
failures
Event-based PM
failures
ASD Comparison ASD Comparison
Complex span: Verbal .24 .08 .36 .03
Complex span: Visual .04 .39 .06 .30
Storage span: Verbal .13 .38 .52 .08
Storage span: Visual .04 .06 .21 .50
Verbal processing .41 .10 .45 .06
Note. PM  prospective memory; ASD  autism spectrum disorder.
 p  .05.
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event-based PM impairment among participants with ASD is un-
likely to be the result of limited statistical power; in both the
current study and the Williams, Boucher, et al. (2013) study,
participants with ASD showed superior event-based PM than
comparison participants, albeit nonsignificantly so. Thus, it is not
simply the case that participants with ASD in the current study (or
in the study by Williams, Boucher, et al.) had genuinely dimin-
ished event-based PM, but that the power of the study was insuf-
ficient for this diminution to cross the traditional threshold of
statistical significance.
An additional finding in the current study was that even on
successful time-based PM trials (i.e., in which participants made
the correct PM response within the target response window),
participants with ASD were less precise in responding (i.e., re-
sponded later within the target window) than comparison partici-
pants. Thus, even when participants with ASD did not completely
forget to carry out their intention, they nonetheless carried it out at
a time that was more distant from the target time than did com-
parison participants. Arguably, this reduced efficiency has real-
world relevance; for example, if one were to take one’s medication
consistently later than prescribed, it might have serious detrimental
consequences to one’s health.
In relation to the second aim of the study, we found that
complex visual span was indeed diminished among individuals
with ASD, as other have suggested. The nonsignificant Group 
Task and Group  Task  Modality interactions in the omnibus
ANOVA indicated complex visual span was no more impaired
among individuals with ASD than was simple visual span. Thus,
the diminution of complex visual span appeared to be rooted in a
reduced capacity to store visual information (simple visual span)
but not in a reduced executive capacity to combine storage and
processing demands. As a result, our findings confirm previous
evidence of a visual storage deficit in ASD (Kenworthy et al.,
2008; Williams, Goldstein, Carpenter, & Minshew, 2005) but
count against the view that ASD is associated with a general,
executively mediated, working memory difficulty. Crucially, there
was little evidence that either simple verbal span or complex
verbal span were diminished among participants with ASD.
With regard to our finding of undiminished verbal span in ASD,
one might argue that the requirement to remember digits, rather
than some other form of verbal material, selectively benefited
individuals with ASD, given that anecdotal reports and findings of
empirical studies have emphasized the relative strength and level
of interest in numbers and numerical operations among intellectu-
ally high-functioning individuals with ASD (e.g., Baron-Cohen,
Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 2003). With regard
to this possibility, it is important to highlight, on the one hand,
evidence showing that neurotypical individuals’ degree of famil-
iarity with the memoranda does influence their performance in
tests of verbal STM (see Brener, 1940). Therefore, it is possible
that individuals with ASD do particularly well on these verbal
storage tasks because of their relatively greater familiarity with
digits.
On the other hand, it is important to note that digit span is a
commonly used and widely accepted index of verbal STM, and
that studies have shown that digit span shares considerable vari-
ance with other “verbal” measures such as word span and
nonsense-word repetition ability (e.g., Alloway et al., 2006; Gupta,
2003; Kane et al., 2005). Moreover, among individuals with ASD,
digit span is associated highly and significantly with nonsense-
word repetition ability to the same extent as it is among neuro-
typical individuals (Williams, Payne, & Marshall, 2013). Thus, in
our view, it is unlikely that verbal span was undiminished among
participants with ASD in the current study merely because of a
hypothetical interest in digits among participants in in this group.
The final aim of the current study was to explore the association
between PM ability and working memory ability. We made the
specific prediction that verbal storage capacity would be uniquely
associated with event-based PM performance among participants
with ASD. This prediction was supported by the data. Whereas
event-based PM was associated uniquely with simple visual span
among comparison participants, it was associated uniquely with
simple verbal span among participants with ASD. Although only
correlational in nature, this result is in keeping with the idea that
individuals with ASD rely uniquely on verbally mediated strate-
gies to succeed on event-based PM tasks, whereas comparison
participants rely more heavily on visually mediated strategies.
There was no such correlation between verbal span and time-based
PM among participants with ASD. However, as discussed, such
verbal strategies are less applicable to time-based PM tasks, be-
cause there is not a directly perceivable environmental cue to
direct participants when to carry out their intention. Thus, even if
an individual continuously rehearsed their intention, this would not
guarantee that they would succeed in carrying out the intention at
the appropriate point. Thus, the lack of a significant correlation
between verbal span and time-based PM among participants with
ASD was in keeping with our expectations. Of course, as discussed
further below, this argument may not be correct. However, it was
made a priori and is directly testable.
Notably, among comparison participants, event-based PM was
associated with simple visual span rather than simple verbal span.
This may provide indirect evidence for a hypothesized link be-
tween PM and “episodic future thinking” (Ford, Driscoll, Shum, &
Macaulay, 2012). According to this hypothesis, the spontaneous
retrieval route, described earlier, is underpinned by the capacity to,
at the time of forming one’s intention to act in the future, mentally
project oneself into the future to imagine the realization of that
intention. Episodic future thinking is fundamentally a visual pro-
cess that depends on aspects of working memory (e.g., Verfaellie,
Race, & Keane, 2012), and thus the relation between visual span
and PM in the current study may reflect this link. Neuroimaging
studies of PM among the typical population support this possibility
and may put the current findings in context. Over a dozen neuro-
imaging studies have shown that performance on PM tasks, rela-
tive to ongoing tasks alone (without PM instructions), is consis-
tently associated with activation in the rostral prefrontal cortex
(PFC; Brodmann Area 10; see Burgess, Gonen-Yaacovi, & Volle,
2011). Although activation of the rostral PFC is relatively insen-
sitive to changes in superficial task structure/content (suggesting it
relates specifically to a superordinate PM component), results
suggest BA10 activation in time-based tasks is more medial than in
(laterally activated) event-based tasks (Okuda et al., 2007). Par-
ticularly important is the recent finding of Volle et al. (2011) that
lesions to right BA10 are associated with specific deficits in
time-based, but not event-based, PM. Thus, future neuroimaging
studies of PM among individuals with ASD may benefit from a
focus on divisions in BA10.
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A key issue in the current study is that among neurotypical
individuals, PM appears to be related to visuospatial processes,
whereas among individuals with ASD, PM is associated with
verbal processes. The notion that individuals with ASD employ
“compensatory” verbal strategies to succeed on cognitive-
experimental tasks is common in ASD research (e.g., Bowler,
1992; Lind & Bowler, 2009; Williams & Happé, 2009). We
suggest that this could be the case for event-based PM also.
Thus, even though event-based PM task performance was un-
diminished in the current sample of ASD participants, we
suggest that the underlying basis of success may have been
different in each group (verbally mediated among ASD partic-
ipants; visually based among comparison participants). This
hypothesis is supported by the different patterns of cognitive
correlates among each group of participants. Of course, this
kind of evidence is not “water tight” and further research would
be necessary to (dis)confirm the hypothesis. For example, the
hypothesis could be supported more definitively by assessing
the effects on PM task performance of concurrent articulatory
suppression (which selectively disrupts verbal mediation; e.g.,
Murray, 1967) and of concurrent spatial tapping (which selec-
tively disrupts visuospatial thinking; e.g., Hyun & Luck, 2007),
respectively. In studies of neurotypical adults, concurrent artic-
ulatory suppression does not detrimentally affect event-based
PM task performance (Marsh & Hicks, 1998; Otani, Landau,
Libkuman, St. Louis, & Kazen, 1997), whereas concurrent
spatial tapping does negatively influence performance (Marsh
& Hicks, 1998). We predict that the opposite pattern would be
observed among individuals with ASD.
The current study builds on those few studies that have
explored PM in ASD and adds to converging evidence of a
selective diminution of time-based PM task performance among
individuals with this disorder. The study also provides prelim-
inary evidence of alternative, compensatory strategy use among
individuals with ASD to mediate PM. In our view, the system-
atic study of PM ability in ASD is highly important and long
overdue. Of course, individuals with ASD are clearly capable of
successful time-based PM under some circumstances; time-
based PM was diminished, but certainly not absent, among
participants with ASD in the current study. Statistically, the size
of this diminution was relatively large (d  0.78). Although it
is always wise to question whether statistical significance
equates to clinical significance, it is the case that even relatively
modest impairments in PM can have serious negative conse-
quences for everyday life and adaptive functioning (e.g., Wil-
son, 1991). Thus, we believe strongly that more work needs to
be done to understand (a) the underlying basis of PM task
performance among people with ASD, and (b) the extent to
which behavioral difficulties with PM (and its underlying basis)
can be successfully remediated among people with ASD. If
people with ASD do employ compensatory strategies to succeed
on event-based PM tasks, do these adequately support everyday
event-based PM? If so, can these strategies be fostered among
individuals with the disorder who do not use them in their
everyday lives? If the compensation turned out not to ade-
quately support everyday PM, can alternative intervention strat-
egies be implemented? We hope that the current research will
motivate and inform future studies that might answer theses
questions and, ultimately, enhance the capacity for behavioral
flexibility among individuals with ASD.
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